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In this paper, the structuralvectorautoregressive (SVAR) model is usedto analyze
short-runandcontemporaneousrelationshipsbetweenmonetaryaggregatesandother
macroeconomicvariables.Thisrequiresimposingrestrictionsonthecorrelationstruc-
tureof theVAR residuals.Dif ferentapproachescanbefollowedto servethistask.One
approachis to usetheCholesky decompositiontogetherwith theassumptionof a re-
cursivestructureof thecontemporaneousrelationshipsbetweenthevariables.Another
approachusesthe informationgivenby the historyof the variables(generalizedim-
pulseresponsefunctions). A third possibility is to adoptrestrictionsfrom economic
theory.
The purposeof this paperis to investigatethe implicationsof the latter technique
in a simplemonetaryframework for both Germany andthe Euroarea.VAR/VECM
residualsareinterpretedasdeviationsof thevariablesfrom their conditionalexpected
values,which arealsoanalyzedin a broadsetof theoreticalmonetarymodels. The
modelusedherebuilds uponthe framework proposedby McCallum (1989)with an
extensionin orderto considertherole of privatebanksin themoney supplyprocess.
The implicationsof this modelfor impulseresponseanalysisarediscussed,andim-
pulseresponsesfor differentmodelsarecalculatedandcomparedto eachother.
Keywords: Impulseresponseanalysis,IS-LM-AS model,monetarypolicy, structural
vectorautoregressive(SVAR) models.
JEL classification:C32,E52.
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1 Introduction




currency andawell functioningmonetarysystem(circulationof money, supplyof credit).To make
this task, the Bundesbankadoptedthe conceptionof controlling a monetaryaggregatein 1975.
Thetheoreticalfoundationsof thisconceptionareformedby thequantitytheoryof money andthe
assumptionof a stablemoney demandfunction. Sincestagethreeof theEconomicandMonetary
Union (EMU) hasstartedin January1999,the EuropeanSystemof CentralBanks(ESCB)is in
chargeof thesinglemonetarypolicy in theeuroarea.1 Theprimaryobjectiveof theESCBis price
stability (definedin Article 105 of the Treatyestablishingthe EuropeanCommunity2), and the
ESCBhasadoptedatwo pillar strategy to achieveits objective. Thesetwo pillarsare”a prominent
role for money, assignalledby theannouncementof a referencevaluefor thegrowth of a broad
monetaryaggregate;anda broadlybasedassessmentof theoutlookfor futurepricedevelopments
andthe risks to price stability in the euroareaasa whole.” (ECB, 1999b,p. 46) It is important
to noticethat the referencevaluefor the growth rateof a monetaryaggregateis not a monetary
target. It ”actsasananalyticalandpresentationaltool which constitutesanimportantbenchmark
for assessingrisksto pricestability.” (ECB,2000,p. 41)
The purposeof this paperis to comparethe role of monetaryaggregatesin the monetarypolicy
conceptionof the Bundesbankand in the monetarypolicy strategy of the ESCBandto investi-
gatetheir implicationsfor the empiricalanalysisof monetarypolicy effects. The development
of a framework for monetarypolicy analysisincorporatesa trade-of betweenthe consideration
of theoreticmodelsin modernmonetaryeconomicsandtheempiricalapplicability. Realisticand
sophisticatedmodelsfor monetaryeconomieshave oftenno uniquetime seriesimplicationsthat
canbeusedin theempiricalanalysisof monetarypolicy. Therefore,it is tried to find a framework
that is on theonehandcompatiblewith the implicationsof standardtheoreticalmodels,and,on
theotherhandis simpleenoughto allow for anempiricalimplementation.Expressedin thewords
of McCallum (1989,p. 201), sucha model shouldbe “(i) reasonablysimple to work with, (ii)
generallycompatiblewith thebasicprinciplesof economictheory, (iii) adequatelyconsistentwith
essentialempiricalregularitiesconcerningmacroeconomicfluctuationsin actualeconomies.”
The plan for the paperis as follows. First, in section2, the monetarypolicy strategies of the
BundesbankandtheESCBarecompared.Then,in section3, a modelof a monetaryeconomyin
which the money stockis determinedby the interactionsof the centralbank,privatebanks,and
the public is presented.In section4, the econometricmethodologyis explained. The empirical
implementationandresultsarediscussedin section5, andsection6 concludes.
2 MonetaryPolicy in Germany andin theEuroArea
2.1 PriceStabilityasObjective of MonetaryPolicy
Both institutions,theBundesbankandtheESCB,arein chargeof maintainingpricestability.3 As
mentionedabove,theobjectiveof pricestability is givenby law. However, theBundesbankandthe
1 Stagethreestartedwith elevenparticipatingcountries(EU-11: Belgium,Germany, Spain,France,Ireland,Italy,
Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Austria,Portugal,andFinland),Greeceenteredthethird stageof EMU on1 January
2001(EU-12).
2 Thetreatyis availablevia internet,for exampleunderhttp://europa.eu.int.
3 If theBundesbankandits monetarypolicy is referredto in this paperit is alwaysmeantthemonetarypolicy of the
Bundesbankuntil 1998.
1
ESCBcandecidehow to defineandhow to achievepricestability. Theargumentsfor pricestability
astheobjectiveof thecentralbankarereviewedfor examplein Bofingeretal. (1996)andin Issing
(2000). First, it is well known that inflation reduceswelfare. If the rateof inflation is correctly
anticipated,thewelfarecostsof inflation originatefrom suboptimalmoney holdings(shoeleather
costs),from thenecessityof priceadjustments(menucosts),andfrom distortionaleffectsof the
tax system. If the rate of inflation is not correctly anticipated,further costsof inflation occur.
Wagesandnominal interestratesarenot correctlyadjustedsuchthat the allocationefficiency is
harmed,andthe incomeandwealthdistributionsareaffected. Second,no convincing or at least
no unambiguousargumentsin favor of a positive inflation rateexist. For example,the positive
effect of inflation on growth dueto a substitutioneffect from money holdingsto holdingsof real
capitalproposedby Tobin canneitherbe shown analyticallynor empirically. High andvariable
inflation ratesareincludedin long-terminterestratestogetherwith a risk premiumandincrease
thereforeinvestmentcosts.In modelsthatfollow Sidrauski(money-in-the-utility-functionmodels)
andin cash-in-advancemodels,outputdoesnot dependon therateof inflation.4 In thesemodels
money is superneutral,that is, the growth rate of money doesnot affect the real equilibrium.5
If price and/orwagerigidities areaddedto thesemodelsit is typically found that real output is
affectedby unanticipatedinflation but not by anticipatedinflation. Therefore,monetarypolicy
cannotsystematicallyincreaseor stabilizerealoutput.
Takingtogetherthesetwo linesof arguments,thatinflation reduceswelfareandthatinflationdoes
notsystematicallyaffect realoutput,givesa theoreticalfoundationfor thechoiceof pricestability
as an objective of monetarypolicy. Combiningtheseargumentswith the conceptualwork of
Tinbergen6 aboutpolicy objectivesand instrumentsleadsto the choiceof price stability as the
singleor primary objectiveof monetarypolicy.
Theobjectiveof pricestabilitycanbedefinedin two ways:eitherasapricelevel or asaninflation
target. If theprice level is targeted,deviationsmustbecompensatedin subsequentperiods.This
addspolicy inducedfluctuationsin inflationandoutputto theeconomybut stabilizesthelong-run
expectationsof the price level. In practice,price stability is definedas follows: until 1984 the
Bundesbankhasassumedanunavoidableinflation basedon theconviction that inflation hasto be
reducedslowly in orderto avoid increasingunemployment.From1984on,a“normative” increase
in thecostof living index of 2%perannumhasbeeninterpretedasin line with pricestability. The
ECB definespricestability asa year-to-yearincreasein theharmonizedindex of consumerprices
of below 2%.
2.2 Implementationof MonetaryPolicy in Germany
The monetarypolicy conceptionof the Bundesbankhasbeenbasedon a two-stageapproach.7
Becausethe time lagsbetweentheoccurrenceof a monetarypolicy impulseandtheobservation
of reactionsof the relevant macroeconomicvariables,especiallyprices,are long and variable,
the Bundesbankhascontrolledan intermediatetarget since1975.8 The intermediatetarget has
4 Both money-in-the-utility-functionmodelsandcash-in-advancemodelsareextensionsof Walrasiangeneralequi-
librium modelswith completelyflexible prices.They arebroadlydiscussedfor examplein Walsh(1998).
5 Superneutralityof money is for exampledefinedin this way in BlanchardandFischer(1989,Chapter4).
6 Following Tinbergen,policymakerscanachieve thedesiredlevelsof targetsif thenumberof independentinstru-
mentsis not lower thanthenumberof targets.For a brief andilluminating overview seeSachsandLarrain(1993,
Ch.19).
7 This sectionfollows mainly DeutscheBundesbank(1995). A descriptionof the conductof monetarypolicy in
Germany is alsogivenin Brand(2001).
8 Seefor exampleFriedman(1990) or Walsh (1998) for the theoreticalfoundationsof choosingan intermediate
target.
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beencentralbankmoney (a virtual money stockvariableconsistingof currency in circulationand
requiredreservesatconstantrequiredreserveratesof 1974)until 1987andM3 (currency in circu-
lation, sightdeposits,time depositsandsavingsdeposits9) from 1988to 1998. Accordingto the
Bundesbank,M3 hasbeenchosenasintermediatetargetbecauseit exhibitsastablerelationto the
futurepricelevel (leadingindicatorpropertyof money for prices)andis sufficiently controllable.
While theleadingindicatorpropertyis widely acceptedin theliteratureit is sometimesquestioned
if theBundesbankhasbeenableto controlM3. Thetargethasbeenmetin thirteenof twenty-four
yearsof monetarytargetingin Germany, seeHoltemöller (2001a).Thedesiredgrowth rateof M3
hasbeenderivedfrom thequantityequationthatequatesmoney stocktimesvelocityof circulation
andrealoutputtimespricelevel. Giventhenormativepricelevel growth describedin theprevious
section,thedesiredmoney growth ratehasbeencalculatedby insertingforecastsof realpotential
outputgrowth andchangesin velocity. Theuseof potentialoutput(andnot expectedrealoutput)
hasbeenfoundeduponthemedium-termandstabilityorientednatureof monetarytargeting.
How hasthe Bundesbankcontrolledthe money stock? The Bundesbankitself hasdescribedthe
controlprocessasquantitysetting(DeutscheBundesbank,1995,p.94)usingits monopolyonissu-
ing currency andrequiredreservepolicy. Assumingamoreor lessstablerelationshipbetweenthe
monetarybaseandthemoney stock,theBundesbankhascalculatedatthebeginningof eachmonth
thequantityof basemoney that is compatiblewith themonetarytarget. Further, theBundesbank
conductedmonthly forecastsof the demandfor basemoney of privatebanks. The gapbetween
normativeandactualdemandfor basemoney hasthentried to beclosedby influencingthemoney
market conditionsby meansof interestrates(Lombardrate,discountrate,andaninterestratefor
openmarketoperations)andso-calledcompensatingor fine-tuninginstruments(foreignexchange
swaps,quick tendersandothers). This type of monetarypolicy canbe called reserve-oriented:
the reservesneededby the bankingsystemto fulfill the reserve requirementarecontrolled– not
completelybut to aconsiderableextent– by theBundesbank.
2.3 Implementationof MonetaryPolicy in theEuroArea
SinceJanuary1999 the single monetarypolicy in the euro areais conductedby the ESCB. In
orderto achieve its givenprimaryobjectiveof pricestability, theESCBhasdevelopeda stability-
orientedmonetarypolicy strategy that consistsof a quantitative definition of price stability, and
a two-pillar strategy usedto achieve price stability.10 The first pillar assignsa prominentrole
to money. A referencevalue for the growth of M3 is calculated(in a similar way to that one
describedin theprevioussection)andpublished.Within thesecondpillar thenon-monetaryrisks
for pricestability areanalyzed.Thesearefor exampletheconditionsanddevelopmentson goods
and labor markets. The ESCB stressesthat both pillars are not targets themselves. The only
target or objective is price stability. Both the analysisof the growth of money stock and the
evaluationof otherrisksto pricestabilityareinformationaltoolshelpingthegoverningcouncilof
theECBto reachdecisionsonmonetarypolicy actions.To thebestof my knowledge,adocument
describinghow the information is weightedis not available. Therefore,it is not clear how the
ECB translatesthe information into monetarypolicy actions,and it is difficult to explain what
guidestheECB in usingits operationalinstruments.It canonly besaidwhich setof instruments
9 Timedepositsandsavingsdepositsareonly includedif they satisfycertainrequirements,seeDeutscheBundesbank
(1995).
10 Themainreferencesfor this sectionareEuropeanCentralBank(1999b)andEuropeanCentralBank(2000).Fur-
therinformationcanbefoundin arecentbookby Issingetal. (2001)andontheinternethomepageof theEuropean
CentralBank: www.ecb.int.
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the ECB usesto manageliquidity and steerinterestrates.11 This set consistsof openmarket
operations,standingfacilities, and the minimum reserve requirement.Openmarket operations
canbedividedinto four groups:mainrefinancingoperations(weekly frequency, maturityof two
weeks),longer-term refinancingoperations(monthly frequency, maturity of threemonths),fine-
tuningoperations(reversetransactions,outright transactions,foreignexchangeswaps,collection
of fixed-termdeposits),andstructuraloperations.Standardfacilities(marginal lendingfacility and
depositfacility) canbe usedby credit institutionsthatareobligedto hold requiredreserves,and
the minimum reserve requirementcreatesthe necessityof centralbanklending; in oppositionto
thepracticein Germany until 1998,theEurosystempaysintereston requiredreserves.
2.4 Comparisonof BundesbankConceptionandESCBStrategy
It hasbecomeclear from the previous sectionsthat the monetarypolicy conceptionof the Bun-
desbankandthestability-orientedmonetarypolicy strategy of theEurosystemarequitedifferent.
The Bundesbankhasuseda theoreticallywell foundedtwo-stageapproachby first determining
thevalueof theintermediatetarget(growth rateof money) thatis compatiblewith thefinal objec-
tive (price stability), andsubsequentlytaking actionsto achieve this specificvalue(or range)of
the intermediatetarget. It shouldbenoticedthat it hasbeenquestionedwhethertheBundesbank
really pursueda policy of monetarytargetingor whetherit hasonly usedmonetarytargetingasa
communicationstrategy.12 However, theBundesbankhasalwaysmadeclearthat it hasbeenac-
countablefor deviationsfrom themonetarytargetandthatdeviationsareonly acceptedif thereare
importanteconomicreasonsfor a deviation. Issing(1997,p. 71), who wasmemberof theboard
of theBundesbankfrom 1990-1998,evenstatesthatdeviationsfrom thetargethave beenmainly
“deliberatemonetarypolicy decisions”.
The Eurosystemdoesnot make useof the two-stageapproach.It puts the focusdirectly on its
ultimate objective price stability andusesthe developmentof the money stockasonepieceof
informationin its decisionprocess,andthe singlemonetarypolicy cannotbe characterizedasa
policy of controlling thequantityof a monetaryaggregate. Instead,theEurosystemcontrolsthe
conditionson the money market, especiallythe main refinancingoperationsminimum bid rate
which is intensively observedby thepublic.
3 A TheoreticalFramework for theAnalysisof MonetaryPolicy
3.1 A BasicModelof theEconomy
A modeltypethatis widely usedin theappliedmacroeconomicliteratureis theIS-LM-AS frame-
work. It consistsin generalof threeequations:anaggregatedemandfunction,a money demand
functionandanaggregatesupplyfunction. This modelhasbeencriticized intensively, especially
11 Theoperationalframework of theEurosystemis describedin EuropeanCentralBank(1998)andEuropeanCentral
Bank(1999a).
12 Two examplesareMishkin (1999,p.588): “Monetarytargetingin Germany andSwitzerlandshouldinsteadbeseen
primarily asa methodof communicatingthestrategy of monetarypolicy that focuseson long-runconsiderations
andthecontrolof inflation.”, andSvensson(2000,p. 2): the“Bundesbankhasactuallybeenaninflation targeterin
deedsanda monetarytargeterin wordsonly.” Seealsothe literaturecitedthere. It hasalsobeensupposedin the
literaturethat theBundesbankfolloweda Taylor (1993)-typeinterestraterule in orderto control inflation, seefor
exampleClaridaandGertler(1996)andBrüggemann(2001). Von Hagen(1999)stressesthata monetarypolicy
strategy is moreimportantfor theclarificationof therole of monetarypolicy within theeconomythanfor guiding
actualmonetarypolicy decisions.
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from the proponentsof real businesscycle theory. As Romer(1996) points out, the main dis-
advantagesof the IS-LM-AS framework asan outcomeof traditionalKeynesiantheoriesof the
businesscycle areconsequencesof building themodelon assumptionsabouttherelationsof ag-
gregatedvariablesinsteadof deriving themfrom microeconomicprinciples. Without specifying
preferences,nothingcanbesaidaboutwelfareeffects,importanteffectscanbeoverseen,andthe
Lucascritiqueapplies.Theadvantagesof theIS-LM-AS approachareits simplicity, andits robust-
ness.Additionally, its is arguedby Walsh(1998,p. 204ff) thattheIS-LM-AS is not “startingfrom
curves” becauseit canbeinterpretedasa specialcaseof a modifiedmoney-in-the-utility-function
modelthat is basedon first principles. The threenecessarymodificationsare(1) theassumption
of a constantcapitalstock,(2) theassumptionof aninelasticlaborsupply, and(3) theassumption
of one-periodnominalwagecontracts.Theseassumptionsarerestrictivebut seemplausibleif the
maininterestof theanalysisis investigatingshort-rundynamics.Therefore,theIS-LM-AS frame-
work satisfiesMcCallum’s criteria (i) and (ii) mentionedearlier. Criterion (iii) – the empirical
quality – is analyzedin section5.
The exact specificationof the threemodel equationsis not unique,and differentspecifications
have beenusedfor different purposes.The specificationusedherefollows McCallum (1981).
BasichypothesesunderlyingtheIS-LM-AS modelare(Modigliani andPapademos,1990):(1) the
money stockunderconsiderationis a narrow onethat is usedmainly for transactionpurposes,(2)
themonetaryauthoritycancontrolthemoney stockup to a randomcomponent,(3) non-monetary
assets(financialandreal)areassumedto beclosesubstitutes,(4) wealthandcapitalaccumulation
have no impacton thesupplyanddemandof goodsandfinancialassets,and(5) governmentand
fiscaleffectsareignored.
The IS equationdescribingthe output-interestcombinationsfor which the plannedand actual
expenditureson outputareequalis	
! "#$&%'%)(*,+ (3.1)
where and arelogarithmsof realoutputandpricelevel,  is thenominalinterestrate, .-0/ ,
and 1 denotestheexpectedvaluegiventhe informationsetof 2 	3 . Thespecificationof the
information set is important,seefootnote13. The real interestrate 456! "$6&% hasa
negative impacton plannedexpendituresbecauseit negatively affectsplannedconsumptionand
investment.TheLM relationdescribesoutput-interestcombinationsfor which money supplyand
money demandareequalata givenpricelevel. It is specifiedas7896;:
<:=>?6:@AB6DC,+ (3.2)
where 78 is logarithmicmoney stock, :EF-G/ , and :@IH0/ . Thenegative impactof theinterestrate
on money demandexpressestheopportunitycostsof holdingmoney, andthe positive sign of :@
is explainedby the transactionmotive of money holdings. TheAS relationcanbe interpretedas
anexpectationsaugmentedPhillips curve or asa Lucassupplycurve statingthatactualoutputis
increasingif inflation is higherthanexpectedor if positivesupplyshocksoccur:BJK
DJ6L6")16! "A%DJK@MNDOP,+ (3.3)
whereJFHG/ , and /Q-JK@R-S3 . Thedisturbanceterms(*T+ACB , and OP areshocksthatareindependent
of pastvaluesof all variables.They areinterpretedasaggregatedemandshock,monetaryshock,
andaggregatesupplyshock,respectively.
Themodelcanbeclosedby specifyingamonetarypolicy rule. This ruleor reactionfunctionlinks
the(intermediate)targetvariableof themonetaryauthorityto thestateof theeconomy. Thechoice
of this targetvariableis discussedin section3.3.Now, themodelcanbesolved,andreducedform
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expressionsfor the endogenousvariables+A"+''+A7 canbe calculated,for exampleby using the
undeterminedcoefficientsprocedure,seeMcCallum(1981)andMcCallum(1989).
Themainimplicationof this typeof modelis long-runneutralityof money.13 Monetarypolicy can
affect therealequilibriumonly in theshort-runby surprisingtheprivateagentssuchthattheactual
inflation ratedeviatesfrom theexpectedinflation rate.
3.2 Money CreationandFinancialStructure
In the traditionalIS-LM-AS modelit is assumedthat themoney stockis setexogenouslyby the
monetaryauthority. As discussedin Holtemöller (2001a),thisassumptionis notapriori reasonable
for developedmonetaryeconomieslike Germany or theEuroareawherenot narrow money but a
broadmonetaryaggregate(M3) is usuallyconsideredin monetarypolicy analysis.Therefore,it
is now discussedhow themodelof theprevioussectionhasto bemodifiedin orderto considera
morerealisticmoney supplyprocess.
Themoney multiplier approachmakesclearthatthreedifferentgroupsof agentsparticipatein the
money supplyprocess.Theseareprivatehouseholdsandfirms,privatebanks,andthecentralbank.
In this section,the role of privatebanksin themoney supplyprocessis discussed.14 This makes
assumptionsaboutthe behavior of banksnecessary. The framework of the following analysis
is the industrialorganizationapproachto bankingtheorylike it is alsousedin Vanhoose(1985)
andin Holtemöller (2001a).15 Banksaretreatedasprofit-maximizingfirms that acceptdeposits
andoriginateloans. Additionally, banksbuy andsell governmentsecurities,suchthat the profit
functionof aprivatebank U is:VW ;XYZ W %D?[\ W )&]^ W _&`4a W )bcZ W + \ W + ^ W + a W %A+ U d3e+=ff=f*+Agh+ (3.4)
where  [ +A ] +A ` areinterestrateson loans( \ ), securities( ^ ), anddeposits( a ), respectively, andZ W areexcessreserveswith revenuefunction XYZ W % . Thisprofit functionis maximizedsubjectto
thebalancesheetrestriction Z W  \ W  ^ W i>31_jk% a W + (3.5)
where j is the requiredreserve rate,andbankshold requiredreserves j a W aswell asexcessre-
serves Z W . Of course,theoperatingcostfunction bY>l!% hasto satisfyusualregularityassumptions
to guaranteetheexistenceanduniquenessof a profit maximum.Themarket structureis assumed
to beasfollows: banksareCournot-oligopolistsonthemarketsfor loansanddeposits.They select
the quantitiesof loansanddeposits,and the respective interestratesaredeterminedby inverse
loandemandanddepositdemandfunctionsof thepublic. Following Vanhoose(1985)theinverse
demandfunctionfor depositsby thepublic is definedas&` Smeon&p]6qEr&sa rpt + mkP+mu@=+mvwH0/x+ a  yz WE{  a W + (3.6)
where mE| areconstants.Themarket for securitiesis competitive.TheLagrangianof themaximiza-
tion problemis }  XYZ W %D?[\ W )&]^ W _&`4a W _bYZ W + \ W + ^ W + a W %~>3jk% a W Z W  \ W  ^ W %+ (3.7)
13 If expectationsin equation(3.1) aredescribedby NLx insteadof KBLx , outputdependson thesystematic
partof monetarypolicy, andmoney is not neutralin thelong run,seeMcCallum(1989,chapter11.2).
14 For anoverview of this topic seefor exampleModigliani andPapademos(1990).
15 This approachis basedon thework of Klein (1971)andMonti (1972). An overview canbefoundin Freixasand
Rochet(1997).
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andthefirst orderconditionsare } Z W   XcTl!% Z W   bcTl!% Z W )~  / (3.8) } \ W    [ \ W )p[   bY>lL% \ W D~  / (3.9) } ^ W   ]   bY>lL% ^ W D~  / (3.10) } a W     ` a W a W p`   bY>lL% a W ~>3jk%  / (3.11) } ~  >3jk% a W Z W  \ W  ^ W  / (3.12)
Using muv1 |L|   ` `  it follows from (3.10)and(3.11)that `0 3 a Wa  mv)  bY>lL% a W i>3jk%   ]   bcTl!% ^ W f (3.13)
Fromthis expression,theinterestratepaidon depositscanbederivedby summingoverall banks:&` 	  >31_jk%  &]   bcTl!% ^ W 0  bY>lL% a W +  ggmv f (3.14)
Assumingconstantmarginaloperatingcostsfor depositsandsecurities,aconstantnumberof banksg , anda constantinversedepositdemandelasticitymakes(3.14)a reducedform expressionfor
the interestrateon deposits.The total quantityof depositscanbe calculatedby inserting(3.14)
into theinversedepositdemandfunction(3.6)andsolvingfor a  :a    `  ] %  r>m@   t + (3.15)
or a  a >p] +'j+f=f=f%Mf (3.16)
Now, thetotal quantityof reserves   (requiredandexcess)is 	j a 6)ZT+ (3.17)
and from (3.8) and (3.10) it can be seenthat Z W is a function of  ] . Therefore,a log-linear
approximationof thequantityof depositsis  ;¡u
#¡k> ] ¡u@P¢,+ ¡kM+¡@wHG/ (3.18)
where
   and ¢ arethelogarithmsof a  and   .
Thefinancialstructuredevelopedin this sectioncannow beaddedto thebasicmodelof thepre-
vious section. The model of the economyconsistsnow of the IS relationship16 (3.1), the AS
relationship(3.3),themodifiedLM relationship78"96;:P
<D:E ]  ` %:@A)CB,+ (3.19)
theinterestrateequation(3.14),andthedeposits-reserve relation(3.18).Theopportunitycostsof
holdingmoney arenow measuredby theinterestratespread,andit is assumedthatthequantityof
money equalsthequantityof deposits( 78N    ). Thatis, currency in circulationis ignoredin this
model. Like thebasicmodelof section3.1, themodelis completedwith a monetarypolicy rule,
andcanthenbe solved for the endogenousvariables ` +A ] +'78T+p6,+A , and ¢ . The choiceof the
monetarypolicy rule is discussedin thenext section.
16 In oppositionto thebasicversionof themodel,therearenow two interestrates: £¤ and £¥ . It is supposedin the
following thattherelevantinterestratein theIS relationis £¤ .
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3.3 Money StockandInterestRateasMonetaryPolicy Instruments
In section2.2, themonetarypolicy of theBundesbankis describedasreserve-oriented.This type
of policy is characterizedby ¢N 3¡@ n&7§¦ D¡u
¨D¡e©ª&]K«q f (3.20)
First, thedesiredlevel of themoney stock 7 ¦ is determined,andsubsequently, thecorresponding
quantityof reservesto be implementedis calculatedfrom (3.20). This is doneoneperiodbefore
the implementationsuchthat the interestrateon securitiesin period 2 hasto be replacedby its
expectation.Equation(3.20)is amonetarypolicy rule closingthemodel.
The monetarypolicy of the ECB cannotbe describedby sucha reserve-orientedrule but may
be describedby an interestrate rule. Thoughthe ECB doesnot intend to control a monetary
aggregateit is assumedasa first approximationthat thedesiredinterestratelevel is chosensuch
thattheexpectedmoney stockis equalto themoney stock 7 ¦ thatis compatiblewith thereference
valuefor money growth. This interestratelevel canbecalculatedby inserting(3.14) into (3.19)
andsolvingfor  ] : ]  7 ¦ :P
¨_1© 6 « ):P@M1©ªB « ):=>c¬&>3jk% P­"®°¯ ± ]   P­"®°¯ ± ` ²:E©!31T3_jK%, « f (3.21)
A possiblemodificationof this interestraterule is to calculatethedesiredinterestratesuchthata
certainpricelevel is expected.Additionally, it wouldbemorerealisticto assumethattheECBtries
to steerthemoney market interestrate  ` andnot theinterestrateonsecurities ] . Additionally, in
section4.3 it will becomeclearthat themodelis not well specifiedwith themonetarypolicy rule
(3.21). In orderto considertheseproblems,assumethat the interestratesetby the centralbank
is a functionof themoney stockandtheprice level. Sucha rule canbe interpretedasa stylized
“two pillar” monetarypolicy rule andis usedin theempiricalapplication.Theexactspecification
is givenin section4.3.
4 StructuralVectorAutoregressiveModelsasTool for Monetary
Policy Analysis
4.1 StatisticalAnalysisof StructuralVectorAutoregressiveModels
Theempiricalanalysisof theimpactof monetarypolicy onmacroeconomicvariablesis conducted
by usingvectorautoregressive models.This is a tool that is widely usedfor this purpose.In its
basicform, avectorautoregressivemodelof order ³ is describedby17´µ6 ¶z | { #· |¸´K|6D¹,+ (4.1)
where ´º»´T+´¼@&T+=f=f=f*+'´K½M&%&¾ is a LÀ¿03B% vectorof endogenousvariables,¹¼RÁg?/x+ÂÃe% is a -dimensionaln.i.d. errorprocesswith meanvector0 andcovariancematrix ÂÃ , µ" containsde-
terministicterms(which areignoredin the following) like a constant,a linear time trendand/or
17 The econometricanalysisof VAR modelsis discussedfor examplein Lütkepohl(1993),Lütkepohl(2001),and
Hamilton(1994).
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dummyvariables.Thecoefficientmatrices· | andthecovariancematrix ÂÃ canbeestimatedusing
theordinaryleastsquarestechnique,andtheoptimal lag length ³ canbedeterminedby compar-
ing informationcriteria like Akaike InformationCriterion (AIC), Hannan-QuinnCriterion (HQ)
or SchwarzCriterion (SC).Oncetheparametersof themodelhave beenestimated,thestructural
informationof themodelcanbesummarizedin differentways. Onepossibility is the inspection
of the implied impulseresponsefunctionsmeasuringthe impactof singleinnovationson theen-
dogenousvariables.Forecasterror impulseresponsesÄ | arecalculatedfrom themoving average
representationof theVAR:18 ´N Åz | { 
 Ä |¸¹¼K|&f (4.2)
The underlyingassumptionthat innovationsin the differentequationsareuncorrelated(that ÂÃ
is diagonal)is in generalnot compatiblewith the observed dataandwith the theoreticalback-
ground.Thecontemporaneousrelationshipsbetweenthevariablescanbeincludedinto themodel
by transformingtheVAR model(4.1) into thestructuralvectorautoregressive(SVAR) model:19
· 
´N ¶z | {  · ¦| ´K|6 · 
A¹T+ (4.3)
where · ¦|  · 
 · | , .Æ3e+f=f=fP+ ³ . A usualway of identifying the instantaneousrelationshipsis to
assumearecursivecausalstructure.Thatis, thefirst variablé is only influencedby innovations
in the first equationand laggedvariables;the secondvariableis affectedby innovationsin the
first equation,by innovationsin the secondequation,and laggedvariables,and so on. In this
case,· 
QÈÇ  , and ÂÃ$ÈÇÉÇÊ¾ , where Ç is a triangularmatrix calculatedusingthe Cholesky
decomposition.Of course,the implicationsof the modeldo now dependon the orderingof the
variablesin ´ . A moregeneralmodelnestingtherecursivestructureis thefollowingone.Equation
(4.1)canalsobewrittenas·  \ %&´Ë¹¼&+ ·  \ %o	Ì½w ·  \ Gf=f=fe · ¶ \ ¶ + (4.4)
where \ denotesthe Lag operator\ | ´È´K| , and Ì>½ is a  -dimensionalidentity matrix. The
structureis now imposedby multiplying (4.4) with ·  · 
 andassumingthat · ¹¼FÍÎ such
that ·I·  \ %&´N · ¹,+ · ¹ÍÎT+ ÎÁSg?/x+MÌ½Ï%Af (4.5)
Thismodeltypeis calledAB-modelby AmisanoandGiannini(1997).Theseauthorsalsoprovide
thefollowing estimationtechnique.Theparametersof themodelareestimatedin two steps:first,
the reducedform (4.4) is estimatedin the usualway by OLS; secondthe Ð  @ coefficients in ·
and Í aredeterminedby imposingat leastÉG3%>Ñ Ð (non-linear)restrictions,andestimatingthe
remaining(atmost Ð  @ Ê4$3B%TÑ Ð ) freeelementsby maximizationof thelog-likelihoodfunction,
which is }  · +MÍQ%Ò :oÔÓ ÐÖÕ!×eØ n*Ù · Ù @ q SÓ Ð8Õ!×eØ n*Ù Í Ù @ q SÓ Ð tr Ú · ¾ Í ¾  Í  ·ÜÛÂÃÝ :oÔÓ ÐÖÕ!×eØ n*ÙªÞÙ @ q SÓ Ð tr Ú Þ ¾ Þ ÛÂÃÝß+ (4.6)
where Ó is thesamplesize, Þ àÍ  · , :º5 Ó áÑ Ð % Õ!â  Ðuã % and ÛÂÃ is a consistentestimatorofÂÃ . Therestrictionsthathave to beimposedto achieve local identificationcanbesummarizedas
18 Sucha representationexists if theprocessis stationary. Thecaseof non-stationarityis ignoredfor thepresentbut
is discussedlater.
19 SVAR modelsarediscussedfor examplein AmisanoandGiannini(1997),Breitung(2000),andHamilton(1994).
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follows: äRå
vec ·    åäIæ
vec Í    æ ç or è äIå // äRæé è vec ·vec Í é  è   å  æé + (4.7)
wherevec is an operatorthat stacksthe columnsof a matrix into a singlecolumnvector,
ä ¯ are
( j ¯ ¿N @ ) full row rankmatrices,  ¯ are( j ¯ ¿R3 ) vectors,andj å andj æ denotethenumberof restrictions
on · and Í , respectively. Therestrictionscanalsobeparameterizedas
vec ·  ^ åPêKå ë å
vec Í  ^ æ,êKæ ë æ ç or è vec ·vec Í é  è ^ å // ^ æ é è êKåêKæ é  è ë åë æ é + (4.8)
where ^ ¯ are( @ ¿íì ¯ ) full columnrank matrices,ë ¯ are( @ ¿03 ) vectors,and ì å i @ Gj å andì æ D @ j æ arethenumbersof freely estimatedcoefficientsof · and Í , respectively.





. Þ  d?Í  · %   ·  ÍY+ î |ðïNñ | ï ¾ î 
=+ <d3e+ Ð +f=f=f (4.9)
where ñ  òóóóóô
·  · @ lElEl · ¶  · ¶Ì½ / lElEl / // Ì>½ lElEl / /lElEl lElElõlElEl lElEl lElEl/ / lElEl Ì½ /
ö÷÷÷÷ø + ï9d©ùÌ>½ / lElEl / « +ñ is a L ³ ¿Y ³ % matrix,and ï is a h¿Y ³ % matrix,or byî | Ä |ál î 
+ Ä 
.	Ì½e+ Ä | |z ú {  Ä |° ú · ú + ð3e+ Ð +f=f=fP+ (4.10)
where · |./ for H ³ . The impulseresponsesareestimatedby replacingthe theoreticalvari-
ableswith therespectiveestimators.In thefollowing, thesamenotationfor theoreticalimpulsere-
sponsesandestimatedimpulseresponsesis used.Theestimatedimpulseresponsesthatarestored
up to horizon  in vec © î 
=+ î +=ff=f+ îÊû « areunbiasedandasymptoticallynormallyindependently
distributedwith covariancematrix
ü Â.ý4  % . Somepreliminarycalculationsarenecessaryto com-
pute Â.ý#  % : Â.þÿ!Ì>½ Í  Ù Ü · ¾ Í ¾  % 0Í  Â å>æ è Ì½ Í ¾ )Í  · % Í ¾  é (4.11)Â.ý4/ %SÂ þ  n Þ ¾    Þ  q Â.þ)n Þ    Þ ¾  q (4.12)
Thematrix Â.ý4  % consistsof   )3B%P  D3B% blocksof dimension @ ¿É @ , denotedby Â.ýo  %&| ú ,o;/x+=f=f=f*+  , 	 S/+f=f=f+  . Thecovariancematrix of vec î | is givenby theblock Â.ýo  %&| | . The
blocksaredefinedasÂ.ýo  %p| ú X|Â vec 
     X ¾ú  ÿ Ì>½ Ô,ïNñ | ï ¾ %  Â.ýo/ % ÿ Ì½ STïñ | ï ¾ %  ¾ + (4.13)'+ 	 d3e+=f=ff*+  , whereX
F;/+ X| |°z W={ 
 n ÿ î ¾ 
 ï4?ñ ¾ % |°, W   Ô©ïñ W ï ¾ « q + 4HG/xf (4.14)
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4.3 CombiningtheEconomicModelandSVAR Theory
The economicmodeldiscussedabove andthe SVAR methodologycanbe combinedin the fol-
lowing way. First, the caseof a reserve-orientedmonetarypolicy is considered.If the model
equationsareusedto calculatethedeviationsof theactualrealizationsfrom theirexpectedvalues,
thesolutionof themodelis givenby thesystem20
òóóô I 3 R /RJ6 3 / /É3 R:@ R:E©3wT31_jK% «  3/ / º¡e 3
ö÷÷ø  
òóóô Û6ÛBÛ  ]Û78
ö÷÷ø  òóóô ÎBÎ=@&Î=v&Î,
ö÷÷ø + (4.15)
wherea hatabove theendogenousvariablessymbolizestheexpectationerror Û´#;´1© ´ « ,and Û78. 787 ¦ . Theerror terms Î|  cannow be interpretedasstructuralshocks: ÎB and Î=@&arerealshocks,Î=v& is a money demandshock(MD) and Î, is a money supplyshock(MS). In the
empiricalapplication(section5) it is assumedthat :E©3wG>3_jK% «  is constant.This is clearlynot
thecase,especiallyfor therequiredreserve rate j . However, theanalysisin Holtemöller (2001a)
hasshown thattheimpactof therequiredreserve rateis only importantif therelationbetweenthe
monetarybaseandthe money stock is considered.The monetarybaseis part of the theoretical
model usedhere,but is not part of the reducedform (4.15). This justifies to someextent the
constancy assumption.
In caseof aninterestraterule, thesolutionis givenby thesystem
òô I 3 /RJ6 3 /3 R:@ 3 öø   òô
Û6ÛBÛ78
öø  òô ÎBÎ=@&Î=v& öø f (4.16)
By assumingthattheexpectedvaluesof theendogenousvariables,© ´ « canbecalculatedfrom
a VAR representation,theVAR residuals¹ canbeinterpretedasdeviationsof thevariablesfrom
therespectiveexpectedvalues: ¹ Û´´")© ´ « f (4.17)
TheSVAR framework providestheeconometricmethodologyto modeltherelationsbetweenthese
deviationsempirically. The structuregivenby the matrix · of the respective modelcanbe esti-
mated,andthe implied impulseresponsesof differentmodelscanbecompared.For thevalidity
of this approachit doesnot matterwhetherthevariablesin themodelarestationaryor not. The
contemporaneousrelationsthat areconsideredin the SVAR modelarerelationsbetweenexpec-
tation deviationsin the theoreticalmodel,andrelationsbetweenVAR residualsin the empirical
model.21 Both arestationaryby definition, regardlessof theorderof integrationof thevariables
themselves.22
Thestructuregivenby (4.16),however, is not identified.Thefirst andsecondequationcannotbe
distinguishedfrom eachotherempirically. Therefore,the stylized“two-pillar” monetarypolicy
rule N ê  ê @'78T+ ê + ê @H0/f (4.18)
20 SeeVanhoose(1985).
21 Theapproachof specifyinga structuralmodelfor VAR residualsis alsofollowedby BernankeandMihov (1998),
for example,in orderto identify monetarypolicy shocksin theU.S.
22 Theeffectof integrationon estimationandcalculationof impulseresponsesis discussedin section5.2.
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is usedinstead.Themodeleconomycannow bedescribedby
òóóô 3 É3uÑJ / /I 3 I / ê  / 3  ê @É3 I:@ I:= 3
ö÷÷ø  
òóóô Û6ÛBÛ Û78
ö÷÷ø  òóóô ÎBÎ=@&Î=v&Î,
ö÷÷ø + (4.19)
wherethethird equationis themonetarypolicy rule andthefourth equationis themoney demand
function,suchthat Î=v& canbeinterpretedasmonetarypolicy shock(MP) and Î, asmoney demand
shock(MD). This identificationschemeis very similar to the reserve-orientedmonetarypolicy
model.It is lessrestrictivebecausethecoefficientof thepricelevel in themonetarypolicy equation
is not restrictedto zerolike it is thecasein thereserve-orientedmonetarypolicy model.
In theempiricalanalysisof sections5.2and5.3,anadditionalidentificationschemethathasbeen
suggestedby Leeperet al. (1996)is appliedasa benchmark.This identificationschemeis given
by
·  òóóô 3 / / /JK@' 3 / /JKv' JKv,@ 3 JKv/ / JTv 3
ö÷÷ø f (4.20)
The first andsecondrow representhe behavior of the privatesector, andit is assumedthat the
financialvariables and 7 have no contemporaneouseffect on  and  . The two privatesector
shocksthatareidentifiedby thisstructurearecalledP shockandP@ shocklateron. Thethird row
canbe interpretedasmoney demandrelation23, andinnovationsto the fourth equationrepresent
monetarypolicy shocks.This setof identifying restrictionsis not basedon anexplicit modelbut
is rationalizedby economicargumentsby Leeperet al. (1996).
5 EmpiricalApplicationof theMonetaryPolicy Analysis
Framework
5.1 Puzzlesin theAppliedSVAR Literature
The SVAR approachhasbeenusedin a largenumberof empiricalstudies.However, in mostof
themthe recursive identificationschemeis applied.24 Specialinteresthasbeenput on the iden-
tification of monetarypolicy shocksandthe responsesof macroeconomicvariablesto monetary
policy shocks.25 Within theSVAR approach,monetarypolicy shocksarecalculatedby assuming
that theAB-model (4.5)describestherelationshipsbetweentheestimatedVAR residualsandthe
underlyingeconomicshocks.Therecursiveidentificationschemeisaspecialcaseof theAB-model
with · iÌ>½ and Í iÇ , where ÇÇ¾5ÂÃ and Ç is lower triangular.26 Usingthis identification
scheme,many authorshave foundimpulseresponsesthatdiffer from intuitiveeconomicinterpre-
tations. This is especiallythe casewhenthe analyzedsystemconsistsonly of the four variables
price level, realoutput,interestrate,andmoney stock. Examplesarethepricepuzzle(a positive
23 Anothernormalizationthatrestricts to oneandnot   would make thismoreevident.
24 Therearealsostudiesin whichidentificationis achievedby imposinglong-runandshort-runrestrictionsin theway
introducedby BlanchardandQuah(1989).Thisapproachis not consideredhere.
25 A review of therecentliteratureon this topic canbefoundin Christianoetal. (1999).
26 An equivalentspecificationis !#"%$ k and & diagonal.
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responseof priceson a positive innovation in the interestrate),andthe liquidity puzzle(a non-
negativeresponseof theinterestrateonapositive innovationin themoney stock).In otherwords,
thereis aliquidity puzzleif noliquidity effect is observed.Theliquidity effect is originally defined
in a setupin which monetarypolicy is describedby changesin themoney stock. In sucha setup,
theinitial declineof theinterestrateafteranincreasein themoney stockis calledliquidity effect,
seefor exampleDornbuschandFischer(1994,p. 493 f.). In the following, the notion liquidity
puzzleis usedin a broadersense.In additionto the casein which thereis no liquidity effect in
theway just described,thecasein which the interestrateis themonetarypolicy variableandthe
money stockdoesnot respondnegatively onpositive interestrateinnovationsis alsocalledliquid-
ity puzzle.It shouldbenoticedthattheliquidity effect is only ashort-runeffect. As timegoeson,
this effect is possiblyovercompensatedby incomeandFishereffect.27
In largersystemsof openeconomies,two additionalpuzzlessometimesoccur: theexchangerate
puzzle(a depreciationof the domesticcurrency as responseon a positive innovation in the do-
mesticinterestrate),andtheforwarddiscountbiaspuzzle(appreciationasresponseto a positive
interestratedifferentialbetweendomesticandforeign interestrates).28 It hasbeentried to solve
thesepuzzlesin differentways.Supposethatthecentralbankincreasestheinterestrateif it expects
a higherlevel of pricesin thefuturethanis compatiblewith its pricestability objective. If actual
innovationsin the price level area leadingindicator for future pricesthenpositive innovations
in theprice level arerespondedby an increasein the interestrate. By extendingthe information
setandincludinga leadingindicatorfor futureprices,thepuzzlecanpossiblybesolved. Often,
commodityprices,exchangerates,or an import price index areconsideredasleadingindicators
for the aggregateprice level. Sims(1992)shows that the positive responseof pricesto innova-
tions in the interestrate in VAR modelsof monetarypolicy effects in France,Germany, Japan,
theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStatestendsto becomesmallerwhencommoditypricesand
exchangeratesareincluded. However, the price puzzledoesnot disappearin all cases.For the
U.S., it is possibleto avoid the price and liquidity puzzlesif commoditypricesand additional
monetaryaggregateslike the monetarybaseareaddedto the system.This approachis taken in
Leeperetal. (1996)andChristianoetal. (1999).Theaugmentationmakesaseparationof different
sourcesof shockspossible.While the augmentationapproachstill relieson a recursive identifi-
cationscheme,Leeperet al. (1996)(U.S.)andKim andRoubini(2000)(non-U.S.G-7 countries)
find non-recursiveidentificationschemesthataresuccessfulin avoidingpuzzles.AggregatedEuro
areadatais analyzedinter alia in Monticelli andTristani (1999)andBrandandCassola(2000).
While Monticelli and Tristani (1999) identify structuralshocksby imposingan openeconomy
IS-LM-AS model,BrandandCassola(2000)use“a theoreticallyneutralway of deriving impulse
responses”(p. 15) by calculatinggeneralizedimpulseresponsesassuggestedin PesaranandShin
(1998).Theopeneconomymodelof Monticelli andTristani(1999)givesGermanmonetarypolicy
ananchorrolewithin theEuropeanexchangeratemechanism(ERM). Theresponseof inflation to
monetarypolicy shocksis not significantlydifferentfrom zeroandexchangerateeffectsarevery
small.Theliquidity puzzlecannotoccurbecausethemoney stockis not consideredin this model.
In the systemof BrandandCassola(2000),thereis no liquidity puzzlebut the price puzzlestill
occurs(theresponseof theinflation rateon anincreasein theshort-termor thelong-terminterest
rateis positive). Impulseresponsesin Germanmonetarysystemsareaddressedin Lütkepohland
Wolters(1999)andBenkwitzet al. (2001),for example.In bothstudies,an import price index is
addedwithout alwayssolvingthepuzzles.
In thefollowing, it is shown in a simulationexamplethattherecursive identificationschememay
27 Theseeffectsarealsoexplainedin DornbuschandFischer(1994,p. 493f.).
28 Priceandliquidity puzzlesarediscussedinter alia in Leeperet al. (1996)andStrongin(1995)for theU.S.andin
Kim (1999)for theG-7countries.Kim andRoubini(2000)analyzealsotheexchangerateandtheforwarddiscount
biaspuzzlesfor non-U.S.G-7countries.
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be misleadingin practice. Considerthe price puzzleandlet the vectorof endogenousvariables
be ´ÈL6T+'B,+AT+A78p% . Assumethat the truemodelof theeconomyis an IS-LM-AS modelwith
a stylized“two-pillar” monetarypolicy rule asdescribedby (4.19). The innovationsin the third
equationcanbeinterpretedasmonetarypolicy shocks,andtheresponseof thepricelevel in period2  on a monetarypolicy shockin period 2 is givenby |  v , that is theentry in thefirst row and
third columnof theimpulseresponsematrix
î | . Thecalculationof î | is explainedin section4.2.
Assumethat Íd;Ì½ anddenotetheentriesof theinverseof · by J ú ¶ . Recallingthat î 
. ·  Í ,
thecontemporaneousresponseof thepricelevel to amonetarypolicy shockin thestructuralmodel
is  ('
  v  J v . In the caseof recursive identification,this responseis *)
  v  / . For ,+ 3 , the
impulseresponsesarecalculatedby
î |" Ä | î 
 , whereÄ | arethecoefficientmatricesof the“non-
structured”MA-representationgiven in (4.10). The Ä | -matricesare the samefor the structural
modelandtherecursive modelandtheir entriesaredenotedby - |  ú ¶ . The responsesof thepricelevel on amonetarypolicy shockin thestructuralmodelcannow bewrittenas ('|  v ËJ v - |  ,DJ @,v - |  @<DJ v,v - |  v)J Tv - |  . (5.1)
while thecorrespondingresponsein therecursive identificationcaseis )|  v )6v,v - |  v< /Tv - |  .E+ (5.2)
where ú ¶ aretheentriesof Ç , andv.)@,v.	/ by definition.
For thesimulation,thenon-zeroentriesof · in themodelgivenby (4.19)arespecifiedasfollows:
·  òóóô 3 I/xf10 / /Ð f20 3 Ð f20 /É3ef Ð 0 / 3 R/f23403 3 Ð 3
ö ÷÷ø f (5.3)
Thesevaluesaresomehow arbitrary, but thesignsarecompatiblewith the theoreticalmodeland
thevaluesarerealisticin thesensethat they reflectplausibleeconomicrelationships.Given that¹ ·  Î it follows that ÂÃ ·  Â5 ·  %p¾ and
·   òóóô /f7686/xf°3:9GR/f!3:9GI/f /4;3ef°39D/xf Ð 0 R/f Ð 0 I/f!3:;/f /x3À/xf°3:< /f Ð 9 /f!3=3R/f13 3À/xf /49GR/f7<49 /f794<
ö ÷÷ø + ÇS òóóô /xf76>< / / /R/f2<8?/f7<49 / /R/f /89/f!3e3 /f29x3 /R/f10B//f7? Ð R/f Ð 0_/f2<Ï/
ö ÷÷ø +
suchthat  ('|  v dI/xf°3:9 - |  ,<)/f Ð 0 - |  @<D/f Ð 9 - |  vo)/f7<49 - |  . (5.4)
and  )|  v ;/xf293 - |  v4_/f Ð 0 - |  .Ef (5.5)
Thereis a broadrangeof Ä | matricesfor which  /'|  v and *)|  v canhave differentsigns. The Ä |
matricesdependon the VAR coefficient matrices· | . Considera VAR with lag length1. The
matrix ·  is now generatedby a randomnumbergeneratorsuchthat the entriesare normally
distributedwith thefollowing expectedvaluesandstandarddeviations:































Notes: Thesolid linesin graphs(a), (b), and(c) arethemedianimpulseresponsesusingtherespective identification
scheme.In case(a), the impulseresponsesarecomputedusingthe structuregiven by ! . In cases(b) and(c), the
recursive identificationschemeis applied.Thedashedlinesareupperandlower quartiles.Graph(d) shows themean
impulseresponsesof cases(a), (b), and(c).
implying that thevariablesareautocorrelated,but thereareno specialassumptionsaboutthedy-
namicrelationsbetweenthevariables.Theeconomicstructureis only givenby thecontempora-
neousrelationshipsexpressedby · . 10,000 ·  -matricesthat imply a stableVAR29 andnegative
“true” impulseresponses30 arecomputed.Then, impulseresponsesusing the recursive identifi-
cationschemearecalculatedand it is countedfor how many realizationsof ·  the sumof the
impulseresponsesfor theperiods0 to 16 is positive ( A B| { 
  )|  v Hd/ ). In 27%of theconsidered
cases,in which the theoreticalstructuralcumulatedimpulseresponseis negative, the cumulated
impulseresponseusingtheCholesky decompositionwith theordering +Aá+A'+A7$% is positive. One
determinantof the sign of the impulseresponseis J6  v , that is the coefficient of the oneperiod
laggedinterestrate in the price level equationof the VAR. Even if this coefficient is negative,
the Cholesky decompositiongivespositive impulseresponsesin 5% of the consideredcases.31
Impulseresponsesthat arecalculatedusinga recursive identificationschemeare in generalnot
invariant to changesin the orderingof the variables. This caneasilybe seenwhen the reverse
orderingis considered.In this case,the responseof priceson innovationsin the interestrate is
measuredby  )DC|  T@ )¼¦@,@ - |  T@ ¼¦v,@ - |  Tv< ¼¦T@ - |  E+ (5.6)
29 Only !  matricesareconsideredfor which all rootsof DetE F HG ! IKJ "ML lie outsidetheunit circle.
30 The theoreticalimpulseresponsesimplied by ! and ! are calculated,and only realizationsof ! for whichN .OP7Q>RTSVUWPYX [Z L areconsidered.This criterion doesnot excludethat the impulseresponseis positive for single
periods,but thatdoesnotharmtheexperiment.
31 It is not clear if this coefficient is positive or negative in an economicmodel. It measuresthe averageimpactof
interestratechangeson the price level. The interestratecanincreasefor differentreasons.If a monetarypolicy
action is the reasonfor the increasein the interestrate,a negative impact is expected.However, if the nominal
interestraterisesbecauseexpectedinflation is increasing,the impactcouldbepositive. Further, a higherinterest




is similar if theorderingof thevariablesis reversed.29%of therealizationsthat imply negative
“true” impulseresponsesleadto positive impulseresponsesif theCholesky decompositionwith
reverseordering 7 +A+A"+?% isused,andif thecoefficientof thelaggedinterestratein thepricelevel
equationis negative, the Cholesky decompositiongivespositive impulseresponsesin 7% of the
caseswith “true” negativeresponses.Theseresultsareillustratedin figure1. Part (b) of thefigure
shows that the upperquartilesof the impulseresponsesimplied by the recursive identification
schemewith ordering(+'"+A+A7 ) arepositive at all horizonsthoughthe cumulatedtrue impulse
responseis negative. It canbeseenin part(d) thatin average,thesignis correct,but theimpactis
underestimatedandtheshapedependson theorderingof thevariables.
5.2 EmpiricalMonetaryPolicy Analysisfor Germany
In thissection,asmallmonetarysystemfor Germany is investigated.Impulseresponsesof macroe-
conomicvariablesto monetarypolicy shocksarecalculated.It is shown that thekind of problem
describedin theprevioussectionpossiblyoccurswhenmonetarypolicy shocksin a smallmone-
tary systemaretried to beidentifiedusinga recursive identificationscheme.Like in otherstudies
of themonetarypolicy transmissionprocessandlikesuggestedby theeconomicmodelof section
3, the \6 endogenousvariablesin the SVAR analysisarethe logarithmicprice level ( ), the
logarithmicrealGDP(  ), an interestrate(  ), andthe logarithmicnominalmoney stockM3 ( 7 ):´õL,+AB&+A?T+A78&%p¾ .32 In the resultsreportedhere,a long-terminterestrate is used.33 Impulse
responsesthatarecalculatedusinga recursive identificationschemearecomparedto impulsere-
sponsesthatarecalculatedusingthereserve-orientedmonetarypolicy model,thetwo-pillar mon-
etarypolicy rule modelandtheLeeperet al. (1996)identificationscheme.Theconfidencebands
for impulseresponsesthatareusedherearecalculatedby addingandsubtractingtwo asymptotic
standarderrors.
First, in section5.2.1, the VAR is estimatedusing the level representationand ordinary least
squares.It is known that the consideredvariablesare instationaryandpotentiallycointegrated.
Breitung(2000,Theorem2.2)shows,thatimpulseresponsescanbeefficiently estimatedfrom the
unrestrictedVAR aswell asfrom avectorerrorcorrectionmodel(VECM) with correctlyimposed
cointegrationrank. In smallsamples,however, asclaimedby Breitung(2000,p.75),it “may bead-
vantageousto useaVECM representationwith apropercointegrationrankto estimatetheimpulse
responses.” Therefore,thereducedrankregressiontechniqueis appliedto estimatetheVECM in
section5.2.2. FromtheVECM representation,the level representationcanberecovered,andthe
structuralanalysiscanbeundertakenin thesameway asif thelevel representationwasestimated
directly. Theresultsof this procedurearecomparedto thoseof theunrestrictedVAR case.
5.2.1 Calculationof ImpulseResponsesfrom theLevel Representation
VAR Specification. Thesampleperiodfor thisanalysisis 1975to 1998,andthedatais quarterly
(for detailsseeA.1). For thisperiod,thereserve-orientedmodelis aconsiderableapproximationto
monetarypolicy in Germany. However, asshown in Holtemöller (2001a),thereis someempirical
evidencethat doesnot supportthe reserve-orientedmonetarypolicy model. Therefore,the two-
pillar monetarypolicy rule modelis notexcludedapriori.
32 Thedatais describedin AppendixA.
33 Thesameanalysishasalsobeenconductedusinga short-terminterestrateinstead.Theresultsarevery similar to
thosereportedhere.
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TheVAR modelis specifiedasfollows:´µ6 ¶z | { #· |¸´K|6D¹,+ (5.7)
where µ" comprisesthefollowing deterministicterms:constant,linear time trend,seasonaldum-
mies,thestepdummyDS902,andlagsoneto four of DS902.34 The lag lengthselectioncriteria
suggestone(SC),one(HQ), andseven(AIC) lags.Startingwith themostparsimoniouslagspeci-
fication(SC,HQ: one),lagshavebeenaddeduntil thereseemsto benosubstantialautocorrelation
left in theresidualswhich is thecasefor ³  4. Theresidualcorrelationmatrix is]^^
_
3 I/xf /4; R/f Ð / /xf Ð /I/f /4; 3 /f!3:< R/f /4;I/f Ð / /f!3:< 3 /xf />3/f Ð / I/xf /4; /f />3 3
`aa
b + (5.8)
from which can be seenthat thereis still correlationbetweenthe residuals.35 This remaining
correlationis analyzedin thefollowing structuralanalysis.All impulseresponsesaredepictedbut
only theimpulseresponsesrelatedto monetarypolicy arediscussedin thetext. Thefigureshaveto
bereadasfollows. Thecolumnsrepresenthevariousinnovationsor shocks,andin therows, the
responseof avariableto therespectiveshocksis presented.Thelabel dcõ7 , for example,means
the responseof the money stockon an innovation in the interestrate. In caseof non-recursive
identificationschemes,theinnovationsin therespective equationscanbeinterpretedexplicitly as
economicshocks,andMP c  , for example,meanstheresponseof thepricelevel on a monetary
policy shock.As mentionedbefore,theconfidencebandsarecomputedby addingandsubtracting
two asymptoticstandarderrors.
(a)RecursiveIdentification. Impulseresponsesoninnovationsin 7 (figure2) and (figure3) that
arecalculatedusingtherecursive identificationschemeandtheordering +Aá+A'+'7$% areshown in
column(a) of figures2 and3 in AppendixD.36 Thisorderingis chosenbecauseit canbeassumed
that the financialvariables and 7 have no contemporaneouseffect on inflation andoutputbut
have aneffect in laterperiods.This orderingis alsochosenby Leeperet al. (1996).Theliquidity
puzzlecanbeobserved: innovationsin themoney stockhavea positiveeffect on theinterestrate.
An increasein themoney stockhastheexpectedpositiveeffect on thefutureprice level andonly
a smallandmerelysignificantimpacton output. Thepricepuzzleoccurs:the responseof prices
on apositive innovationin theinterestrateis positive.
(b) Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model. The identificationschemethat is implied by the
reserve-orientedmonetarypolicy model is given in equation(4.15). The matrices· and Í are
estimatedin theway describedin section4, andtheresultsof this estimationarereportedin table
2, AppendixC. Thecorrespondingimpulseresponsescanbeseenin column(b) of figures2 and3.
34 DS902is zeroup to thefirst quarterof 1990,andoneafterwards.With thisdummyvariablethestructuralbreakin
thedatadueto theGermanunificationis modeled.
35 The correlationbetweenthe differentresidualsis only weakly significant. If the residualcorrelationmatrix was
an identity matrix, the residualswould alreadybe orthogonal. However, comparingthe forecasterror impulse
responses(which aregivenby e P in equation(4.10),but arenot depictedhere)with the orthogonalizedimpulse
responseshows that thereis somesystematicinformationleft in theresidualcrosscorrelations.This is reflected
by significantnon-zerocontemporaneousorthogonalizedimpulseresponses.
36 The impulseresponseson innovationsin  and f arenot of interestin this context. They aredepictedin a longer
versionof this paperthatis availableon theauthor’shomepage.
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Theinnovationin theinterestrateequationcanbeinterpretedasamoney demandshock(MD), and
theinnovationin themoney equationasamonetarysupplyshock(MS). An increasein themoney
stockleadsto increasingfutureprices,andalsoto a contemporaneousdecreasein theinterestrate
(this is not obvious in the figure but canbe confirmedby looking at the numericalvaluesof the
impulseresponseandthecorrespondingstandarderror). After a shorttime, however, the interest
rateincreases.This effect canpossiblybeexplainedby theFishereffect. Individualsexpectthe
increasein thepricelevel andadjusttheir inflation expectations.Adding thereal interestrateand
increasingexpectedinflationyieldstheincreasingnominalinterestrate.In thethird columnit can
be seenthat a price puzzledoesnot occur: a shockthat increasesthe interestratedoesnot lead
to increasingprices. This setof impulseresponsesis thereforemorecompatiblewith standard
assumptionsaboutreactionsto innovationsin money stockandinterestratethantheoneimplied
by therecursive identificationscheme.
(c) Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel. Theestimatedstylizedtwo-pillar monetarypolicy
rule is given in the third row of the · -matrix in the middle part of table2. Innovationsin the
money stockhave theexpectedimpacton the interestrate,but theactualinnovationsin theprice
level enterthemonetarypolicy rulewith thewrongsign.Therefore,theimpulseresponsesimplied
by this structuremay not be asexpected,too. They aredepictedin column(c) of figures2 and
2. The money demandshockis essentiallythe sameasin the reserve-orientedmonetarypolicy
model, and the monetarypolicy shockin column (c) is essentiallythe negative money supply
shockin column(b).Giventhewrongsignandnon-significanceof thepricelevel coefficient in the
two-pillar monetarypolicy rule, thereserve-orientedmonetarypolicy model,in which themoney
stockis themonetarypolicy variable,seemsto bea reasonableapproximationto monetarypolicy
in Germany from 1975to 1998.
(d) Leeperetal. (1996)IdentificationScheme. For comparisonpurposes,theLeeperetal. (1996)
identificationscheme,thatis describedby (4.20),is alsoconsidered.TheSVAR estimationresults
canbefound in the lower partof table2, andthecorrespondingimpulseresponsesareshown in
column(d) of figures2 and3. Themoney demandshockhassensibleresponses,thereis no price
puzzle. Furthermore,asthe fourth columnshows, an increasein themoney stockhasa positive
impacton thefuturepricelevel. However, thereremainsa liquidity puzzle.
In the next section,the robustnessof theseresultsis examinedby repeatingthe analysisusinga
vectorerrorcorrectionmodel(VECM) insteadof theVAR modelin levels.
5.2.2 Calculationof ImpulseResponsesfrom theVECM Representation
VECM Specification. Theanalysisin Holtemöller (2001a)hasshown that thevariablesconsid-
eredherearenot stationarybut integratedof orderone.To incorporatethis stochasticpropertyof
thedata,thefollowing VECM is estimated:
g ´NËµ	© V  ¡e « è ´   é  vz | { ih | g ´K|6D¹,+ (5.9)
where
   is the stepdummyDS902for the Germanunification,and µ containsa constant,sea-
sonaldummies,and the first differencesof DS902up to lag three. The Johansentracetest on
cointegrationis appliedin combinationwith simulatedcritical valuesthatconsiderthepresenceof
a dummyvariablethat is restrictedto the cointegrationspace.The resultsof the Johansentrace
test are (5% critical valuesin brackets, the constructionof thesecritical valuesis explainedin
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Holtemöller (2001a)):  
  114.30(56.02),    48.41(35.38),  @  16.25(19.80),and  v  5.18
(5.89).  | is thehypothesisthatthecointegrationrankis at most  . Thehypothesisis rejectedfor<;/ and <d3 ata significancelevel of 5%,suchthata cointegrationrankof two is applied.37
Theresidualcorrelationmatrix is]^^
_
3 I/xf /4; R/f°36 /xf°3:?I/f /4; 3 /f!3 Ð R/f!3e3I/f!36 /f!3 Ð 3 /xf /49/f!3:? I/xf°3e3 /f /49 3
`aa
b f (5.10)
The signsarethe sameasin the residualcorrelationmatrix obtainedfrom the estimationof the
VAR in levels.Themagnitudesareslightly different,but thereis still contemporaneouscorrelation
betweenthe residuals,seealso footnote35. Now, the VAR representationis derived from the
estimatedVECM suchthatimpulseresponsescanbecalculated.
(a) Recursive Identification. Theorderingof thevariablesis asbefore:(+Aá+A'+A7 ). Theimpulse
responsesimplied by theVECM andtherecursive identificationschemeareplottedin column(a)
of figures4 and5. Mostof theresponsesareasexpected.Thereis no liquidity effect,andtheprice
puzzlecanstill beobserved. It shouldbementionedthat theeffect of an increasingmoney stock
on theprice level is now of permanentnature.Thepossibilityof permanentimpactsof shocksis
introducedby consideringthe instationarybehavior of thevariables.In stableVARs, the impulse
responsesconvergealwaysto zerowith increasinghorizon.
(b) Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model. Fromtable3 it canbeseenthatthepointestimates
for theentriesof thematrix · arevery similar to thosecalculatedform theVAR level represen-
tation. In general,this is alsotrue for the impulseresponses(column(b) in figures4 and5), but
therearesomedifferences.For examplethepricepuzzleis notsolvedin thisspecification,andthe
impactof anincreasein theinterestrateonoutputis now permanentandnot transitory. Finally, the
small initial liquidity effect canalsobeobservedhere,but without theovercompensatingeffects
thatareobserved in figure2. However, the resultof themodelin levels that the reserve-oriented
monetarypolicy modelseemsto beavalid identificationschemefor Germany is supportedby the
structuralVECM.
(c) Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel. In caseof thetwo-pillar monetarypolicy rule iden-
tification scheme,thepoint estimatesfor theentriesof · – given in the middlepart of table3 –
differ from thecorrespondingestimatesin table2. For example,themonetarypolicy rule is now
estimatedwith plausiblesigns,andsmallerstandarderrors.Theimpulseresponseslook alsocon-
vincing, seecolumn(c) in figures4 and5. Restrictive monetarypolicy shockshave a negative
impacton thepricelevel. However, thiseffectdiesoutaftera few periods.Thereis alsoaliquidity
effect in thesensethat themoney stockis negatively affectedby themonetarypolicy variablein
thismodel,namely . However, thepositiveinnovationsin themoney stockhaveapositiveimpact
on the interestrate. Therefore,thereserve-orientedmonetarypolicy modelmaystill be regarded
asthemostappropriateidentificationschemefor themonetarytransmissionprocessin Germany.
37 The cointegrationrelationsarenot reportedhere,and they arenot usedin the further analysis. Of course,it is
possibleto combinea detailedspecificationof thecointegrationrelationswith theSVAR methodology. This is for
exampledonein Brüggemann(2001).
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(d) Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme. Applying theLeeperet al. (1996)identification
schemein theVECM givesagaina very similar pictureto that in theunrestrictedVAR case.The
estimatesfor · and Í canbe found in the lower part of table3 and the impulseresponsesare
depictedin column(d) in figures4 and5. Theimpulseresponsesdiffer from theresponsesin case
of theunrestrictedVAR only in thepermanenceof someeffects.
5.3 EmpiricalMonetaryPolicy Analysisfor theEuroArea
Thesampleperiodfor thefollowing analysisof monetarypolicy effectsin theEuroArea(without
Greece)is 1980:1to 1999:4.Thedatais quarterlyandseasonallyunadjusted,for detailsseedata
appendix. The vector of endogenousvariablesconsistsof the samevariablesas before: ´YL6T+'B,+AT+A78p%p¾ , where is againa long-terminterestrate.Thisapplicationshouldbeinterpretedas
anexamplefor futureinvestigationbecausetherehasbeenno singlemonetarypolicy in theEuro
Areain thesampleperiod.Theassumptionof anareawide monetarypolicy in this sampleperiod
hasalsobeenmadeby Monticelli andTristani(1999)andBrandandCassola(2000).
5.3.1 Calculationof ImpulseResponsesfrom theLevel Representation
As a VAR modelfor theEuroArea,equation(5.7) canbe applied,but µ now comprisesonly a
constant,seasonaldummiesanda lineartime trend.Otherdummyvariablesarenotneededin this
casebecausethedatais adjustedfor theGermanunification(andalsootherstructuralbreakslike
reclassificationsor areachanges)by theECB.Thelaglengthssuggestedby informationcriteriaare
one(SC),six (HQ), andeight(AIC). While a lag lengthof onedoesnot removeall autocorrelation
from theVAR residuals,thereseemsto beno substantialautocorrelationleft afteraddinglagsup
to lag lengthfour. Therefore,thelag lengthis setto ³  4. Theresidualcorrelationmatrix is]^^
_
3 /fj6 3 /f /e/ /f!3=3/f763 3 /f /4< /f!3E//f /Ï/ /f /4< 3 /f Ð 9/f°3:3 /f!3E/ /f Ð 9 3
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b + (5.11)
whichexhibitssomedifferencescomparedto theresidualcorrelationmatrix in theGermancase.38
It might beexpectedthattheimpulseresponsesalsoshow adifferentpicture.
(a) Recursive Identification. Usingtherecursive identificationscheme,thepricepuzzlecanalso
beobservedin theEuroArea,seecolumn(a) in figure7. Additionally, it canbeseenthat innova-
tionsin themoney stockleadto futureincreasesin thepricelevel, seecolumn(a) in figure6. The
responsesof the interestrateandthemoney stockon eachotherarenot significantin largeparts
of theconsideredhorizon,a liquidity effect cannotbeobserved.
(b) Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model. The estimatesfor · and Í aregiven in table4.
Despitethe fact that by far not all of the Euro areacountrieshave followed a reserve-oriented
monetarypolicy, theimpulseresponsesfor this casein column(b) of figures6 and7 give a more
plausiblepicture than thoseimplied by the recursive identificationscheme. However, there is
still a smallpositive impactof an increasein the interestrateon theprice level aftersix quarters.




The liquidity effect can clearly be seenin the MS schock c  impulseresponse:A positive
innovation in the money stock leadsto a contemporaneousdecreasein the interestrate. This
effect is (over)compensatedaftersomequartersby theincomeand/orFishereffect thathave been
describedearlier. Theresponseof thepricelevel onamoney supplyshockis alsoasexpected:The
price level increaseswith a considerabletime lag after a positive innovation in the money stock
hasoccurred.
(c) Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel. As discussedin section4.3, this modelcanbe in-
terpretedasanapproximationto themonetarypolicy strategy of theECB.Like it is thecasein the
analysisfor Germany, theimpulseresponsesimpliedby this identificationschemeareverysimilar
to thosecalculatedwith thereserve-orientedmonetarypolicy identificationscheme.A contractive
monetarypolicy shockexpressedby apositiveinnovationin theinterestratehasanegativeimpact
onthepricelevel afternineto twelvequarters,asmallandtransitorynegativeeffectonrealoutput,
anda negative impacton the money stock. The price puzzlecannotbe observed. However, the
estimatedmonetarypolicy rule is not convincing becausethecoefficient of priceshasthewrong
sign,but is notsignificant,seetable4. Thiscanpossiblybeexplainedby thefactthatpricestability
in the euroareahasnot hadthe sameimportancein the sampleperiodasit hasnowadays.The
positivecontemporaneouseffect of a positive innovationin themoney stockon theinterestrateis
still puzzling.
(d) Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme. For theEuroarea,theLeeperet al. (1996)iden-
tification schemeseemsto be not appropriate.The price puzzleoccurs,andthe responseof the
pricelevel on a monetarypolicy shock,representedby column(d) of figure6, is not plausible:an
expansivemonetarypolicy shockthatincreasesthemoney stockanddecreasestheinterestratehas
a negative impacton thefuturepricelevel.
5.3.2 Calculationof ImpulseResponsesfrom theVECM Representation
VECM Specification. Thestochasticpropertiesof theconsideredEuroareatime seriesaredif-
ferent from the correspondingGermantime series.While nominalmoney is an I(1) variablein
Germany, theEuroareamoney stockM3 is an I(2) variable.39 Thevectorerrorcorrectionmodel
in theI(2) casecanbewrittenas:
g @ ´	µ V ´ h g ´ @z | { ik | g @ ´K|D¹,f (5.12)µ containsagainthe deterministicterms. The exact specificationof the deterministictermsis
determinedtogetherwith thecointegrationindices j (numberof I(0) relations)and ë (numberof
I(1) relations)usingthe testproceduredescribedin Holtemöller (2001b). The valuesof the test
statistic ^ml  n canbefoundin table1. Following theargumentsof Juselius(1998),thecointegration
indicesarenot only determinedon thebasisof the testresultsbut alsoon thebasisof economic
plausibility. At a significancelevel of 5%, thetestprocedurestopsat model2, jY Ð , and ë /
implying 9;jcSë_ Ð stochasticI(2) trends. The differencebetween̂ @  
  35.65and the
corresponding5% critical value(36.12)is very small. Thenext teststatisticin thetestprocedure
is ^ @  4 25.00with acorrespondingcritical valueof 26.00.Thisscenariois muchmoreplausible
from an economicpoint of view. The I(2) variablesin this systemare 7 and  , andit is shown
39 Theorderof integrationof Euroareamoney andpricesis analyzedin Holtemöller (2001b).Thestatisticalanalysis
of I(2) variablesis alsoexplainedthere.
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Table1: TestingHypothesesabouttheCointegrationIndices,EuroAreaSystemj Model ^ml  n o l
0 2 172.13 128.97 111.55 102.48 100.31
3.1 172.13 125.83 105.89 93.93 87.93
3.2 170.01 123.71 103.85 92.35 87.93
1 2 96.55 67.44 56.42 53.76
3.1 101.30 64.60 49.28 42.69
3.2 98.21 62.19 47.75 42.69
2 2 35.65 25.00 22.93
3.1 39.63 26.58 18.38
3.2 36.53 24.27 18.38
3 2 13.26 8.31
3.1 12.94 8.30
3.2 9.00 8.30Q_jIDë 4 3 2 1 0
Notes: Teststatisticpq X r for testinghypothesesaboutthecointegrationindicesandthedeterministictermsasdescribed
in Holtemöller (2001b).ThecolumnModel refersto thedeterministicmodel,seeHoltemöller (2001b)andMosconi
(1998,p. 27). Centeredseasonaldummiesareincludedin all cases.A hypothesisis not rejectedif theteststatisticis
smallerthanthecorrespondingcritical value.Thesecasesareindicatedby bold face.Thecritical valuescanbefound
in theHoltemöller (2001b),for example.
in Holtemöller (2001b)that thesetwo variablescointegrateto an I(1) relation. Therefore,the
cointegrationindices jQ Ð and ëÆ3 arechosen.Now, theVECM (5.12)is estimatedusingthe
two-stepreducedrankestimationprocedure.40 Theresidualcorrelationmatrix is]^^
_
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which is verysimilar to theresidualcorrelationin theunrestrictedVAR model.
(a) Recursive Identification. Theimpulseresponsesin this case,seecolumn(a) of figures8 and
9 arealmostthesameasin theunrestrictedVAR case.That is, thepricepuzzlecanbeobserved,
anda liquidity effect cannotbeseen.Theonly differenceis that theresponsesof somevariables,
for examplethe responseof real incometo an innovation in the price level, diverge. This is a
consequenceof theI(2) specification.
(b) Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model. Theestimatedmatrices· and Í exhibit only mi-
nor differencesto their counterpartsin theunrestrictedVAR case,seetable5. Consequently, the
impulseresponseslook alsoverysimilar, whichcanbeseenby comparingfigures6/7and8/9.
40 The two-stepestimationprocedureproposedby Johansen(1995) is explainedin Holtemöller (2001b). The I(2)
VECM is estimatedusingtheRATSapplicationMalcolm2.2.Thefollowing structuralanalysisis againperformed
with Mathematicausingthelevel representationof theVECM reportedby Malcolm.
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(c) Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy Rule Model. This modeldescribesthe monetarytransmission
processequallywell asin the unrestrictedVAR case,seecolumn(c) of figures8 and9. In par-
ticular, thereis no pricepuzzle,theprice level respondsnegatively to positive innovationsin the
interestrateafterabout6 quarters.Additionally, a liquidity effectcanbeobservedin thesensethat
positive innovationsin theinterestratelower themoney stock. Thesignof theprice level coeffi-
cientin thetwo-pillar monetarypolicy rule is still not compatiblewith thetheoreticalexpectation,
seetable5.
(d) Leeperetal. (1996)IdentificationScheme. For theLeeperetal. (1996)identificationscheme
applythesameremarksasin theunrestrictedVAR case.Theimpulseresponsesarenotasplausible
asin thetwo-pillar monetarypolicy rule model.
5.4 SummaryandCritiqueof EmpiricalResults
Onefindingof theempiricalinvestigationof monetarypolicy shocksandtheresponsesof macroe-
conomicvariablesontheseshocksis thatthechoiceof theidentificationschemehasaconsiderable
impacton thesignandtheshapeof theimpulseresponses.Therefore,it seemsimportantto have
a plausibleeconomicinterpretationof theappliedidentificationscheme.Therecursive identifica-
tion schemehasnot to beexcludeda priori; theremaybeapplicationsin which therecursiveness
is a propertyof the“true” model.However, in many casesa modelbasedidentificationschemeis
presumablypreferred.Thereserve-orientedmodelfor Germany andthestylizedtwo-pillar mone-
tary policy modelfor theEuroareaseemto beappropriateidentificationschemesin thesensethat
they produceimpulseresponsesthatarecompatiblewith widely acceptedassumptionsaboutthe
monetarytransmissionprocess.
However, it is notclearsofar, how long-runcointegrationanalysisandshort-runstructuralanalysis
influenceeachother. As noticedabove, theimpulseresponsesdo not dependon theway theVAR
is estimated;the unrestrictedVAR andthe VECM producethe sameimpulseresponses,at least
asymptoticallyandif thecointegrationrestrictionsarecorrectlyspecified.This canwell beseen
in theEuroareainvestigation.Theresultsof theimpulseresponseanalysisarevery similar in the
unrestrictedVAR caseandin theVECM case.Ontheotherhand,Benkwitzetal. (2001)show that
in empiricalapplicationsnot only the width of confidencebandsbut alsothe impulseresponses
themselvescanbedifferentwhenthey areestimatedfrom theunrestrictedVAR modelandfrom
therestrictedVECM.
In practice,it maybehelpful to specifythelong-runcointegrationrelationsfirst, andusethis infor-
mationfor theidentificationof thecontemporaneousrelationships.A studyproceedingin thisway
is theanalysisof aGermanmoney demandsystembyLütkepohlandWolters(1999).Theseauthors
considerthevariablesrealmoney, grossnationalproduct,inflation,andinterestratespread.First,
they specifya money demandcointegrationrelationapplyinga singleequationerror correction
approach;then,they includetheresultingerror-correctiontermandlaggeddifferencesof theen-
dogenousvariablesinto astructuralmodelfor thefirst differences.Thestructuralmodelallowsfor
contemporaneousrelationsbetweenthevariablesandis estimatedusingthree-stageleastsquares.
An eliminationprocedureis appliedto eliminateinsignificantregressors.Theestimatedstructural
form is thenusedto calculateforecasterror impulseresponses.This procedurehasthedisadvan-
tagethata largenumberof restrictionsstemsfrom asequentialstatisticaleliminationprocesssuch
thattheeconomicimplicationsimposedby theserestrictionsarenot easyto see.Furthermore,the
singleequationestimationof thecointegratingvectoris only valid if thecointegrationrankis one.
However, this proceduretakesalsocareof thewell known problemthat thenumberof estimated
parametersin aVAR modelis relatively large.Thelargerthenumberof parameters,thelargerare
23
thevariancesof theestimatorsandtheconfidencebandsof theimpulseresponsefunctions.Within
theVAR framework thisproblemcanalternatively beaddressedin thefollowing way: thenumber
of parameterscanbereducedby imposing(zero)restrictionsonsomeof thecoefficientsin thema-
trices · | .41 A consequenceof imposingrestrictionson theVAR parametersis that the likelihood
function for theestimationof thestructuralparametersin thematrices· and Í cannotbecalcu-
latedlike it is donein section4.1,seefor example(Hamilton,1994,p. 331f.). Thecombination
of subsetVAR modelandSVAR modelmaybeaninterestingtopic for furtherresearch.
6 Conclusions
In thispaper, themonetarypolicy conceptionin Germany from 1975to 1998,themonetarypolicy
strategy in theEuroareafrom 1999up to now, andtherespective implementationby theBundes-
bankandtheEuropeanCentralBankareexplained.Both theBundesbankandtheEurosystemare
committedto maintainpricestability. While themonetarypolicy of theBundesbankfrom 1975to
1998canbedescribedasmonetarytargeting,theEurosystemhasadoptedatwo-pillar strategy that
focuseson themoney stockaswell ason otherrisks to price stability. The Eurosystemstrategy
shouldnot beconfusedwith monetarytargeting. An interestraterule seemsmoreappropriateto
describethewayhow monetarypolicy is implementedin theEuroarea.
A theoreticalframework is developedthatallows to incorporatethedifferencesin monetarypoli-
cies in empiricalmodelsof the monetarytransmissionprocess.This framework consistsof an
IS-LM-AS modelextendedby a regimespecificmonetarypolicy rule. It is shown how this frame-
work canbecombinedwith theSVAR methodology. Finally, theframework is appliedto analyze
monetarypolicy in Germany and in the Euro areaempirically. For Germany a reserve-oriented
monetarypolicy model,andfor the Euro area,a stylizedtwo-pillar monetarypolicy rule model
work reasonablywell. While thewidely usedrecursive identificationscheme(Cholesky decom-
position)fails to produceimpulseresponsesthatarecompatiblewith standardassumptionsabout
themonetarytransmissionmechanism,thetwo modelbasedidentificationschemesuggestedhere
producesensibleimpulseresponsesets.Themainconclusionis thereforethatthestatisticalVAR
modelshouldbeaugmentedwith economicstructurein empiricalapplications.This canbedone
by cointegrationanalysisandby analyzingthe contemporaneousrelationshipsbetweenthe vari-
ablesusingtheSVAR approachlike illustratedhere.





M3: Endof monthmoney stockM3 (currency in useplussightdepositsof domesticnon-banks
at domesticbanksin Germany plus time depositsfor lessthanfour yearsof domesticnon-
banksat domesticbanksplus savings depositsat threemonths’ notice of domesticnon-
banksat domesticbanksin Germany) in billions of DM, seasonallyunadjusted.Monthly
data(TU0800)from the CompactDisc DeutscheBundesbank(1998),continuedwith data
from the monthly bulletin of the DeutscheBundesbank,table II.2. 1975:01-1990:5West
Germany, and1990:06-1998:12Germany, not adjustedfor Germanunification. Quarterly
dataareendof quarterstocks.
NominalGDP: Grossdomesticproductin currentprices,in billions of DM, seasonallyunad-
justed. Quarterlydata(DQ0727)for 1975:01-1990:02,WestGermany, from the Compact
Disc DeutscheBundesbank(1998), continuedwith data for 1990:03-1998:04,Germany,
from DeutschesInstitut für Wirtschaftsforschung(DIW) Berlin (from the DIW-statfinder:
http://www.diw-berlin.de).
Real GDP: Grossdomesticproductin 1991 prices,in billions of DM, seasonallyunadjusted.
Quarterlydatafor 1975:01-1990:02,WestGermany, from theCompactDiscDeutscheBun-
desbank(1998)(DQ0728).Datafor 1990:03-1998:04,Germany, is calculatedastheratioof
nominalGDPandGDPdeflator.
GDP deflator: NominalGDPdividedby realGDP, 1975:01-1990:02,quarterlydata,WestGer-
many, continuedwith GDPdeflator, 1990:03-1998:04,quarterlydata,Germany, from DIW
Berlin (DIW-statfinder:http://www.diw-berlin.de).
Long-terminterest rate: Yields on bondsoutstandingissuedby residents,monthly averages,
fractions,monthly data(WU0017) from the CompactDisc DeutscheBundesbank(1998),
continuedwith datafrom themonthlybulletin, tableVII.5. Quarterlydataaretherespective
valuesof thelastmonthin aquarter.
A.2 EuroAreaData
TheEuroareadatawasprovidedby NunoCassola.Furthernoteson theconstructionof theeuro
areaaggregates(11 countries)beforethe introductionof the euro (back to 1980)canbe found
in BrandandCassola(2000). The definition of the variablesis as follows (adjustedstocksare
constructedwith flow statistics):
M3: Adjustedstockof theeuroareamonetaryaggregateM3 in billions of euro. Thequarterly
dataareaveragesof monthlydata.Theindex of stocks(December1998= 100)is multiplied
by the December1998stockof M3. The percentagechangebetweenany two dates(after
October1997)correspondsto thechangein theaggregateexcluding theeffect of reclassi-
ficationsetc. M3 comprisesM1 andin addition,depositswith agreedmaturity up to two
years,depositsredeemableat noticeup to threemonths(M2) andmarketableinstruments
issuedby theMFI sector(repurchaseagreements,money market fundshares,money market
paperanddebtsecuritiesup to two years).
RealGDP s l % : Nationalserieson realgrossdomesticproductat market pricesareaddedafter
they havebeenrebasedto acommonbaseyear(1995)andconvertedto eurovia theirrevoca-
ble fixedconversionratesof 31 December1998.Adjustedfor Germanunification.Billions
of euro.
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Nominal GDP ts % : National serieson nominal grossdomesticproductat market pricesare
addedafter they have beenconvertedto eurovia the irrevocablefixed conversionratesof
31 December1998. Adjustedfor Germanunification. Billions of euro. ESA95datato the
widestextentpossible.
GDP Deflator(GDPP): NominalGDPdividedby realGDP.
Long-terminterestrate: Weightedaverageof euro-11annuallong-terminterestrates.Weights:
GDP weightsat purchasingpower parity exchangeratesin 1995. Nationalseriesarefrom




Themethoddescribedin this sectionis a methodof theMarquardttype,that is, it is anextension
of the methodof scoringin orderto reducenumericalproblems,especiallyin the caseof a near
singularinformationmatrix. The methodbelongsto the classof ordinarygradientmethodsand
canbecharacterizedby theiterationalgorithm42 ¾ W  " 	 ¾ W ¢ W a W + (2.1)
wherethevariablesthatarefreely estimatedarecollectedin therow vector ¾ , thatis in theactual
case ¾Ê © ê ¾å ê ¾æ « . The positive scalar ¢ W is the stepsize of eachiterationstep,and a W is the
directionvectorwhich is definedastheproductof a weightingmatrix u W andthegradientof the
objective functionin row form, evaluatedat  W :a W  u W }vw7x + }vw7x    } zyyyy v x 
¾ f (2.2)
While theNewton-Raphsonmethod,that is derivedfrom a second-orderTaylor seriesexpansion
around W , usesthenegative inverseof theHessian   @ }    ¾ (2.3)
asweightingmatrix, themethodof scoringreplacestheHessianwith thenegativeof theinforma-
tion matrix Ìá©ù « dR8©  « + (2.4)
suchthat  ¾ W  " ; ¾ W ànARÌ"©  ¾ W «q  }v w x f (2.5)
Theabovementionedextensionis capturedby ¾ W  " 	 ¾ W  n RÌá©ù ¾ W « |{<Ì~}A } q  }v w x f (2.6)
Theparameter{ is determinedby { ;~ ä }vw2x  + (2.7)
where ~ is thelargesteigenvalueof  , and ä is chosenindividually dependingon thegoodness
of the quadraticapproximationof the objective function that hasbeenusedabove in the Taylor




is increasingif theapproximationis poor). The iteratingrule is now (2.6) if{H/ and(2.5) if {|;/ . Theiterationalgorithmstopsif usualconvergencecriteriaareachieved
(absolute/relativeincreasein thelog-likelihoodor absolute/relativechangein  arebelow acertain
boundor a total numberof iterationsis reached).
The gradientvectorandthe informationmatrix aregiven in AmisanoandGiannini (1997). The
calculationsin section5 aredoneusingaMathematicaimplementationof thisalgorithm.A version
of this paperwith moretechnicaldetailsis availableon theauthor’shomepage.
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AppendixC. SVAR EstimationResults
Table2: SVAR Results,Germany, VAR Model (5.7)
Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model (4.15)
Numberof iterationstepsis 36. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1293.76· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.26 1 2.26 0 0.02 0 0 0
(0.96) – (0.96) – (0.00) – – –
AS  9.36 1 0 0 0 0.04 0 0
(4.48) – – – – (0.02) – –
MD  1  2.92 11.58 1 0 0 0.07 0
– (3.69) (16.05) – – – (0.09) –
MS 0 0  0.26 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.25) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel (4.19)
Numberof iterationstepsis 34. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1296.06· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.94 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.05) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 2.04 1 2.04 0 0 0.02 0 0
(4.85) – (0.85) – – (0.00) – –
MP 1.33 0 1  3.06 0 0 0.02 0
(1.16) – – (2.41) – – (0.02) –
MD  1  2.97 12.25 1 0 0 0 0.07
– (4.29) (18.88) – – – – (0.11)
Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme(4.20)
Numberof iterationstepsis 15. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1297.14· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P 1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P@ 0.30 1 0 0 0 0.02 0 0
(0.37) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD 0.43  0.08 1  0.52 0 0 0.01 0
(0.18) (0.05) – (0.28) – – (0.00) –
MP 0 0 1.29 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.86) – – – – (0.00)
Notes: SVAR estimationalgorithmasdescribedin AppendixB. The algorithmstopsif the relative changeof the
log-likelihoodis smallerthan0.00001.Standarderrorsin brackets.
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Table3: SVAR Results,Germany, VECM (5.9)
Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model (4.15)
Numberof iterationstepsis 36. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1337.43· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 1.67 1 1.67 0 0.02 0 0 0
(0.81) – (0.81) – (0.00) – – –
AS  11.54 1 0 0 0 0.05 0 0
(6.88) – – – – (0.02) – –
MD  1  2.63 11.30 1 0 0 0.06 0
– (3.54) (17.03) – – – (0.09) –
MS 0 0  0.20 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (0.27) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel (4.19)
Numberof iterationstepsis 48. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1337.27· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  7.57 0 0 0.10 0 0 0
– (27.07) – – (0.35) – – –
IS 20.16 1 20.16 0 0 0.11 0 0
(22.38) – (22.38) – – (0.13) – –
MP  1.62 0 1  0.51 0 0 0.01 0
(0.46) – – (0.19) – – (0.00) –
MD  1 0.01 0.27 1 0 0 0 0.01
– (0.07) (0.22) – – – – (0.00)
Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme(4.20)
Numberof iterationstepsis 15. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1339.94· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P 1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P@ 0.33 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.37) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD 0.37  0.07 1  0.67 0 0 0.01 0
(0.23) (0.06) – (0.51) – – (0.00) –
MP 0 0 1.57 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (1.31) – – – – (0.00)
Notes: SVAR estimationalgorithmasdescribedin AppendixB. The algorithmstopsif the relative changeof the
log-likelihoodis smallerthan0.00001.Standarderrorsin brackets.
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Table4: SVAR Results,EuroArea,VAR Model (5.7)
Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model (4.15)
Numberof iterationstepsis 17. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1257.51· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.23 1 2.23 0 0.01 0 0 0
(1.42) – (1.42) – (0.01) – – –
AS  3.43 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.82) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  1  0.61 2.84 1 0 0 0.01 0
– (0.38) (1.83) – – – (0.01) –
MP 0 0  0.58 1 0 0 0 0.00
– – (0.21) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel (4.19)
Numberof iterationstepsis 19. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1257.89· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.25 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.10) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 1.51 1 1.51 0 0 0.01 0 0
(1.62) – (1.62) – – (0.01) – –
MP 0.31 0 1  2.07 0 0 0.01 0
(0.60) – – (1.24) – – (0.00) –
MD  1  0.86 4.69 1 0 0 0 0.02
– (1.01) (6.99) – – – – (0.02)
Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme(4.20)
Numberof iterationstepsis 16. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1257.60· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P 1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P@  1.21 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.31) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  0.46  0.08 1 2.45 0 0 0.01 0
(1.06) (0.23) – (6.20) – – (0.02) –
MP 0 0  2.18 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (3.02) – – – – (0.01)
Notes: SVAR estimationalgorithmasdescribedin AppendixB. The algorithmstopsif the relative changeof the
log-likelihoodis smallerthan0.00001.Standarderrorsin brackets.
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Table5: SVAR Results,EuroArea,VECM (5.12)
Reserve-orientedMonetaryPolicy Model (4.15)
Numberof iterationstepsis 18. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1298.53· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
IS 2.43 1 2.43 0 0.01 0 0 0
(1.72) – (1.72) – (0.01) – – –
AS  3.72 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.87) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  1  0.64 3.28 1 0 0 0.01 0
– (0.43) (2.29) – – – (0.01) –
MS 0 0  0.54 1 0 0 0 0.00
– – (0.20) – – – – (0.00)
Two-pillar MonetaryPolicy RuleModel (4.19)
Numberof iterationstepsis 20. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1298.93· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
AS 1  0.23 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– (0.09) – – (0.00) – – –
IS 1.62 1 1.62 0 0 0.01 0 0
(1.93) – (1.93) – – (0.01) – –
MP 0.30 0 1  2.19 0 0 0.01 0
(0.62) – – (1.38) – – (0.00) –
MD  1  0.88 5.24 1 0 0 0 0.02
– (1.13) (8.43) – – – – (0.02)
Leeperet al. (1996)IdentificationScheme(4.20)
Numberof iterationstepsis 14. Themaximizedlog-likelihoodis 1298.60· Í   7 ÎB Î=@ Î=v Î
P 1 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0
– – – – (0.00) – – –
P@  1.43 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
(0.33) – – – – (0.00) – –
MD  0.32  0.06 1 1.78 0 0 0.01 0
(0.60) (0.14) – (3.75) – – (0.01) –
MP 0 0  1.82 1 0 0 0 0.01
– – (2.32) – – – – (0.00)

























































































































































































































Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy























































































































































































































Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Notes: Identificationschemes:(a) recursive (4 ), (b) reserve-orientedmodel, (c) two-pillar monetarypolicy
rule model,(d) Leeperet al. (1996).
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Bofinger, P./ Reischle,J./ Scḧachter, A. (1996): Geldpolitik: Ziele, Institutionen,Strategien und
Instrumente.München:Vahlen.
Brand,C. (2001): Money stockcontrol and inflation targeting in Germany: a statespacemod-
ellingapproachto theBundesbank’soperatingproceduresandintermediatestrategy. Heidelberg:
Physica.
Brand,C./ Cassola,N. (2000): A money demandsystemfor euroareaM3. Working Paper39,
EuropeanCentralBank.
Breitung, J. (2000): Structuralinferencein cointegratedautoregressive processes.Habilitation
Thesis,availablease-bookfrom http://www.xplore-stat.de/ebooks/ebooks.html.
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